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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
Government financial reform was renewed with vigor through a series of 
Congressional laws in the 1990s.  These laws injected interest and scrutiny into 
reform efforts and directed attempts to gain control over federal agency finance 
activities in the areas of accountability and performance.  Leading the attempts 
was the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  The GAO (formerly the 
General Accounting Office) was initially created out of the Budget and 
Impoundment Act of 1921 to provide for auditing responsibilities, accounting, and 
claims functions for the US Government.1  Over time, due to changes in 
legislation and changing needs of Congress, the mission of the GAO has 
changed.  This is best manifested in its recent name change from the General 
Accounting Office to the General Accountability Office.  The GAO website now 
lists its objectives as four-fold2: 
• Evaluating how well government policies and programs are working; 
• Auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are 
being spent efficiently, effectively, and appropriately; 
• Investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities; and 
• Issuing legal decisions and opinions 
The goal of the GAO, in short, is to make federal government agencies 
more effective.  The thrust of their work involves evaluating and offering opinions 
on ways to improve government functioning.  The GAO High Risk List is one of 
the many ways that the GAO attempts to fulfill this function.  High Risk List 
identified items specifically target those organizations that exhibit substandard 
 




financial and managerial performance with the intent of directing improvement 
toward those efforts.  The work and functioning of this report will be studied in 
further detail with a focus on how it interacts with other executive agency 
financial management systems. 
A second major effort involved the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) oversight of agency audited financial statements.  The Office of 
Management and Budget was created in 1970 from the old Bureau of Budget, 
which had been originally established by the Budget and Impoundment Act of 
1921.  The agency is principally chartered to be the executive agency with overall 
responsibility for preparing the President’s budget and overseeing financial 
operations and execution among all federal agencies.  By virtue of its function in 
executive financial oversight, OMB was tasked with the responsibility of 
monitoring financial accountability requirements laid in place by the Chief 
Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Management Reform Act of 
1994.  The principal output of this requirement is audited financial statements for 
federal agencies.  With OMB as the principal guiding agent, federal agencies 
have met with various levels of success and failure in obtaining unqualified 
opinions in their financial statements.   
The latest oversight system is the President’s Management Agenda 
(PMA) Agency Scorecard.  Initiated in FY2002, this system is intended to 
measure agency performance and results as identified in standards set by the 
current administration.  The scorecard finds its roots in the Government 
Performance Results Act of 1993 and focuses on achieving performance and 
results-oriented management for government.  The scorecard is also guided by 
OMB as the President’s’ executive agency for financial operations and execution.   
These three measures of federal agency financial accountability and 
performance, while separate, should all be related in the context of measuring 
agencies’ overall financial success. Comparing their stated goals and an analysis 
of interrelationships and trends between data will help provide a framework for 
addressing financial reform success within current defined federal guidelines. 
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B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
The overall objective will be to provide an analysis of trends and 
interrelationships between the three major federal financial oversight systems – 
the PMA Scorecard, Audited Federal Financial Statements, and the GAO High 
Risk List.  At a high level, it will provide information on which agencies tend 
toward success or failure with respect to these measures.  An analysis of the 
interrelationships between the three systems will identify any impact or overlap 
the systems may have on one another.  It will show which system trends signal 
success among other systems.  For example, it may help identify whether 
accountability (as measured by unqualified opinion on financial statements) 
translates to performance success on the PMA Scorecard. 
The research is undertaken with an exploratory focus.  An overview of the 
three systems is presented with a focus on their intents and purposes.  Through 
this overall systems look, relationships are established that may dictate links 
between agency success and system linkages.  A detailed look into each specific 
agency is not provided in this report.  Rather, the focus is on the overall 
relationships of agencies within the discussed systems.  True causal links are 
difficult to propose without the benefit of further research into the individual 
agencies discussed.  As such, the data and trends are presented at a top level 
with the intent of revealing relationships and providing focus for further research. 
Data findings in the professional report will help to identify trends between 
three federal measurements of financial accountability and performance.  The 
trends will potentially provide signaling points that identify those organizations on 
the verge of success as measured by the systems.  The proper identification of 
these relationships could help agencies better target reform initiatives and/or 
provide informed knowledge of those specific items that drive success.   
C. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology of work begins with the identification of the problem. In 
the case of federal agencies, multiple measures exist which define the success 
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or failure of financial management within the agency.  While all of these 
measures provide worth in the improvement of federal financial management, the 
interrelationships and value-added aspects of these measures must be 
addressed. 
Numerous frameworks address financial accountability and performance 
in organizations.  While most models address financial accountability in profit-
motivated organizations, they do provide for an informed foundation on federal 
financial management techniques.  While the application of these frameworks to 
federal agencies always proves more difficult, the case is made for the 
importance and relevance of these criteria in federal financial management.  
These cases will be presented for the three financial systems discussed. 
Raw data for agency comparisons will be obtained through relevant 
agency reports.  The data will be ordered and reviewed as both a function of their 
relationships between systems and individual system changes over time.  As the 
data is ordinal in nature, nonparametric statistical tests will be applied.  A starting 
point for data analysis will be based around three relationships: 
• Analysis of PMA Scorecard and audited financial statements across 
their respective operating timeframes.  The goal will be to look for 
agencies that exhibit trends that identify success.  Additional 
comparisons will be made between scorecard “implementation 
progress” data to determine whether it leads to financial performance 
success in the scorecard. 
• The PMA Scorecard will be analyzed as a function of accountability as 
measured by audited financial statement data.  The outcome is to 
determine whether unqualified opinions on audited financial statements 
are a good predictor of performance on the PMA Scorecard. 
• The impact of GAO High Risk list on audited financial statements and 
the PMA Scorecard will be addressed.  It will look at whether GAO 
opinions have had an impact on agency success in those systems.  
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The GAO list comparison will account for agencies that are on the list 
and those who have improved and been removed from the list. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
The project begins in Section II with a look at the history of federal 
financial reform.  Historical reform initiatives over the last century are covered in 
brief followed by a specific focus on recent reform initiatives.  Additional 
emphasis has been placed on recent initiatives as direct relationship may be 
drawn between the specified legislation and the requirement for audited financial 
statements and development of the PMA Scorecard.  The legislation discussed is 
by no means a complete list of financial reform and is not intended as such.  
Throughout, an effort has been made to pare down the extraneous information 
and focus on those initiatives that have had a major impact on the three financial 
systems discussed. 
Section III provides an overview of the three federal financial oversight 
programs compared – The PMA Scorecard, Audited Federal Financial 
Statements, and the GAO High Risk List.  The section will cover the objectives of 
the system, how the agency information is derived, agency grading or scoring 
criteria, and what accomplishments have been ascribed to the systems to date.  
The basic data for system analysis is also provided. 
The data and system analysis is presented in Section IV.  A description of 
data collection methods and statistical methodology is discussed.  As the data is 
ordinal in nature, standard parametric statistical approaches (standard deviation, 
variance) need to be avoided in most cases.  Non-parametric techniques are 
provided to describe the correlation of data between financial systems.  The data 
is first analyzed by describing data trends within separate systems that are of 
value to further analysis.  Financial system data is then analyzed to identify 
trends and provide a comparison between the systems. 
Section V represents the culmination of the project and presents a 
summary of conclusions drawn from the data.  Implications of the resultant data 
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are presented for the Department of Defense.  In addition, as the project is 




                                                
II. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REFORM 
A. EARLY REFORM INITIATIVES 
Government financial reform is by no means a new topic.  Congress has 
attempted to levy various controls on financial and budgetary spending in federal 
government agencies as early as the 1900’s with the Budget and Accounting Act 
of 1921.3  The trend continued throughout the century with the passing of 
legislation such as Public Law 84-863 (1956), the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and the Federal Managers Financial Integrity 
Act of 1982.  Though covering various topics, the legislation represented an 
overall trend toward greater executive branch control of budgeting and tighter 
scrutiny and accountability in its management.4  While recent legislation has 
provided the foundation for many of the financial reform initiatives we see today, 
it is important to present a cursory review of the goals and impact of key financial 
reform legislation over the past century.  The list provided is not inclusive of all 
reform initiatives throughout history, but focuses on those that have had a 
significant impact to the creation of the agencies and systems analyzed. 
1. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 was landmark legislation in terms 
of defining our current budgetary process.  The Act provided for the creation of 
the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) and the 
General Accounting Office (now Governmental Accountability Office).  These two 
organizations where created to be the centralized control points on financial 
management and budget for the executive and legislative branches, 
 
3    Philip J. Candreva, ed. Practical Financial Management, 6th ed.  (Monterey, CA: United States 
Naval Postgraduate School:  2004), 5. 
4.  KnowNet: Federal Budget Execution [web page].  Updated 2 May 2005.  Available at: 
http://www.ogam2000.com/finance/budexecDR/LAI/ModuleI/stat.htm. Accessed 13 June 
2005.
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respectively.5  The Act also required the submission and consolidation of 
executive agency budget requests to the President through the Bureau of 
Budget.  In an excerpt from the Congressional Committee of the Budget, the 
Budget and Accounting Act was developed in response to the belief in the need 
for a strong “centralized approach to financial policy and process” in both the 
executive and legislative branches of government.6
The legislation is important in many respects, not the least of which is the 
creation of OMB and the GAO.  While both seem to be initially chartered as 
paper pushers, record keepers, and auditors, their role has expanded to that of 
central importance in financial reform.  Through the GAO, Congress had created 
a watchdog group of sorts to monitor and report on executive agency financial 
execution and management practices.  GAO has continued to provide ongoing 
evaluations of executive agency financial management, specifically with the High 
Risk Series.  While OMB has always had a strong focus on government budget 
development and control, it has evolved in recent years to be the President’s 
organization in charge of evaluating the effectiveness and performance of federal 
agencies. The most recent incarnation of this management responsibility is 
through oversight of audited financial statements and the PMA Scorecard. 
2. The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 and 
Public Law 84-863 
In addition to amendments to the anti-deficiency act and apportionment 
requirements, the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act had a significant effect 
on agency financial management as it provided congressional direction on 
establishing accounting systems and financial reporting.  In addition, the Act 
makes GAO the accountable agency for establishing federal accounting and 
 
5 DoD iCenter: Legislative Reform Initiatives [web page].  Available at: 
http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/icenter/inforef/legislatemain.htm.  Accessed 2 November 
2005. 
6 Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, The Congressional Budget Process: An 
Explanation.  (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1998): 7. 
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auditing standards.7  These two facets of the Act provide the basics for the early 
development of financial management and control systems and standards.   
Public Law 84-863 (1956) was enacted “to take the necessary action to 
achieve: 1) consistency in accounting and budget classifications; 2) 
synchronization among accounting, budgeting, and organizational structure; and 
3) support of budget justification by information on performance and program 
costs.”8  It gave the President the ability to provide Congress with budget 
information on a cost basis as well as the inclusion of information on financial 
performance and accomplishments.  These two acts have defined executive and 
legislative branch powers and responsibilities in financial reporting and control.  
They are valuable in that they are the basic tenets of current accountability and 
control measures in the federal government. 
3. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 
Beginning with the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, executive control 
over budget and spending was preeminent.  Candreva argues that since the 
1921 Act, executive spending grew as congressional committees did little but 
provide a check on what the president was submitting.9  Concerned over rising 
spending with only little oversight through the greater part of the century (as well 
as specific impoundment concerns ascribed to President Nixon),10 Congress 
passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 to wrest control 
of federal spending back to where it constitutionally belonged – Congress. 
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act had four central 
aspects:  establishment of the Congressional Budget Office; limits on presidential 
impoundment powers, change of the fiscal year (from a July-June cycle to an 
 
7 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Chief Financial Officers Act: A Mandate for Federal 
Financial Management Reform (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 1991), 25. 
8 Deborah McClain, “The Nature of Financial Management in the Federal Government.” (1999): 
31. 
9 Candreva, 6. 
10 Ibid. 
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October-September cycle), and a change to the congressional budget process.11  
The Congressional Budget Office was established to provide congressional 
committees with the information they need to analyze the budget and other 
appropriations bills.12 Specific changes to the process included the creation of 
budget committees and a budget reconciliation to set revenue and spending 
limits.13  The Act also limited the President’s impoundment ability, effectively 
requiring him to spend the money that Congress had signed into law. 
The summation of these legislative changes helped to establish a specific 
process through which Congress could review and address the President’s 
budget.  While these changes are not specifically related to any of the analyzed 
financial systems, they do represent the landmark legislation in reestablishing 
congressional control and influence over federal financial management.  By 
regaining control on budgetary matters, it permitted Congressional insight into 
financial processes and the eventual passage of the major reform initiatives of 
the 1990s.  
4. Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act of 1982 
The FMFIA of 1982 was passed by Congress to “require ongoing 
evaluations and reports of the adequacy of the systems of internal accounting 
and administrative control of each executive agency.”14  The Act modifies the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 and requires individual agency heads to 
establish accounting and oversight controls for the safeguarding of government 
assets in accordance with GAO-developed standards.15  It also directs OMB to 
create an evaluation system to monitor these controls and report to Congress the 
agencies’ ability to meet these controls on a yearly basis.16  The Federal 
 
11 U.S. Public Law 93-344, 93rd Cong. (12 July 1974). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Committee on the Budget, 8. 
14 U.S. Public Law 97-255, 97th Cong. (8 September 1982). 
15 Ibid, Sec 2. 
16 Ibid, Sec 2. 
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Managers Financial Integrity Act essentially created the first report on the ability 
of financial systems to meet agency management needs and ensure public 
confidence in the execution of funds. 
However there have been questions about whether the FMFIA actually 
achieved any of its intended purposes.  A GAO report recognized that while 
many agencies reported material weaknesses in their financial systems for years, 
little appeared to have been done about it.17  Riso addresses many of the issues 
related to underachievement of the FMFIA and reiterates the point that the Act 
has been only “marginally useful.” 18  It appears that while this was a first attempt 
to ensure ‘integrity’ in the financial management process, true change would 
have to wait until the reform initiative of the 1990s. 
B. FINANCIAL REFORM INITIATIVES - 1990S 
The earlier changes of the century, while important in setting the 
groundwork for federal budget development and guidelines, paled in comparison 
to federal accountability requirements enacted in the 1990s.  Beginning with the 
Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act in 1990, Congress launched a series of laws 
designed to “gain control of federal finances.”19  These laws were broad in their 
scope and intent on federal financial reform.  The CFO Act, Government 
Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, Government Management 
Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994, and the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996 vastly altered the landscape of federal fiscal 
accountability and control.  These acts set forth clear goals and objectives in 
reforming government financial management consistent with standard business 
practices.  These efforts included requirements for consolidated and audited 
 
17 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Chief Financial Officers Act: A Mandate for Federal 
Financial Management Reform, 11. 
18 Gerald R. Riso, “Reviving management controls” Government Executive 28 Iss. 5 (May 1996): 
67. 
19 Anonymous, “A Brief History of Reform.” Government Executive 30 no. 6 (June 1998): 44. 
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financial statements, standards for reporting program performance, and 
standardized accounting systems and measures.20
1. Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 
The CFO Act is the main initiating document of federal financial reform in 
the 1990s.  Its stated purpose is to “to improve the general and financial 
management of the Federal Government.”21  The CFO Act does this in three 
ways:   
• By bringing effective financial management to government;  
• The improvement of systems of accounting, financial management, 
and internal control;  
• The production of reliable and timely financial reports.22   
The law requires the centralization of management functions under an 
agency Chief Financial Officer, the completion of annual financial statements, 
and the modernization of financial systems.23
Few would argue with the idea that this legislation acted as a catalyst for 
federal agency financial reform.  The GAO called the CFO Act the “most 
comprehensive and far-reaching financial management improvement legislation 
since the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 was passed over 40 
years ago.”24  Fourteen years later, Congress still appreciates the benefits of the 
CFO Act believing it “the basis for agency financial management.”25  Scholars 
agree as well.  Steinberg relates how the Act resulted in substantially improved 
 
20 Sid Ewer, “Federal Government Accountability.” The CPA Journal 67 no. 3 (March 1997) 
21 U.S. Public Law 101-576, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (23 January 1990). 
22 U.S. Public Law 101-576, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (23 January 1990), Title I, Section 102. 
23 Andrew West and David Clarke, “Government as Business,” The Government Accountants 
Journal 45, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 24. 
24 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Chief Financial Officers Act: A Mandate for Federal 
Financial Management Reform (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 1991), 1. 
25 U.S. House Committee on Government Reform, Department of Homeland Security Financial 
Accountability Act, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., 9 June 2004, 4. 
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and consolidated agency financial systems and major policy and standards 
revisions for federal agencies.26  West and Clarke point to universal support for 
the CFO Act principles by the likes of financial managers, inspectors, and 
auditors.27  In addition, Gross points to synergies in financial practices, increase 
in accountability as measured by audits, and the movement from problem 
identification to solutions for agency financial issues as great benefits of the CFO 
Act.28  The CFO Act’s historical significance on federal financial reform is clear.  
This passage of this law had important ramifications on government 
financial accountability but it was a pilot program for audited financial statements 
as it applied to only a few agencies.  The expansion of the audited financial 
statement requirement through the GMRA in 1994 was a major step forward.  
The CFO Act has been one piece of legislation that has been influential in the 
progress of financial reform and is important in that it is directly linked to the 
creation of audited financial statements and reform concepts as a whole. 
2. Government Performance Results Act of 1993 
While the CFO and GMRA represent the driving force behind government 
financial accountability, two other acts had significant impact in the 1990s - the 
GPRA and the FFMIA.  The first of these acts involves implementing managerial 
accounting type initiatives in federal government.  Congress considered federal 
managers and government decision makers handicapped by waste, inefficiency, 
and lack of attention to results.29  To combat these perceived weaknesses, the 
GPRA added requirements for internal management, performance measurement, 
and managing for results.30  It represents a major shift from traditional execution 
functions to one focused on comparing results with the agency mission and 
 
26 Harold Steinberg, "The CFO Act: A Look at Federal Accountability,” Journal of Accountancy 
181, no. 3 (March 1996): 55. 
27 West and Clarke, 20. 
28 Daniel Gross, “Baby Steps,” CFO 12 no. 7 (July 1996): 28. 
29 U.S. Public Law 103-62, 103rd Cong. (5 January 1993), Section 2. 
30 Ibid. 
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desired outcomes.  As Breul puts it, the act “articulates what they [agencies] are 
trying to accomplish, how they will accomplish it, and how Congress and the 
public will know whether they are succeeding.”31
The requirement of strategic planning and this emphasis on meeting 
results has led many to conclude, if only moderately, that the GPRA was a 
success.  Breul considers the GRPA a success in developing and implementing 
a performance management framework in government.32  The President’s 
Management Agenda and the use of the agency scorecard is an extension of the 
principles of the GPRA.  David agrees that the PMA has demonstrated that the 
administration is determined to see results in management government 
resources.33  
3. Government Management Reform Act of 1994 
The scope of initial reform efforts was expanded with the GMRA.  While 
the Act was directed by Congress to “provide a more effective, efficient, and 
responsive government,”34 the relevant thrust of the legislation was to expand 
CFO requirements to all 24 major federal agencies.35  It additionally included a 
requirement for a single, auditable consolidated federal financial statement.36  
The Act sets fiscal year 1996 as the first year for audited financial statements for 
all federal agencies.  By expanding financial statement requirements to all 
agencies, the GMRA validates and reinforces CFO Act principles of financial 
accountability. 
 
31 Jonathon Breul, “The Government Performance and Results Act – 10 Years Later,” The 
Journal of Government Financial Management 52 Iss. 1 (Spring 2003): 58. 
32 Breul, 63.  
33 Irwin T. David, “Financial Information for Program, Policy, and Operating Officials,” The Journal 
of Government Financial Management  51 no. 1 (Spring 2002): 14. 
34 U.S. Public Law 103-356, 103rd Cong., 2d sess. (25 January 1994), 
35 U.S. Public Law 103-356, 103rd Cong., 2d sess. (25 January 1994), Title IV, Section 405. 
36 Ibid. 
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4. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 
The FFMIA of 1996 echoed the earlier purposes of the CFO Act and 
GMRA and sought to strengthen reform efforts. The FFMIA added requirements 
for standards of accounting and systems across agencies and gave OMB an 
oversight role in agency financial reform.37  The FFMIA makes development of 
these financial systems and standards a priority, with real consequences if the 
objectives are not met.38  Despite early drafts of the bill, no budgetary 
consequences are involved.  It does provide for inclusion into Congressional 
financial reports the names of agency officials responsible for failing systems and 
potential for their dismissal.39  Some, notably Athanasaw, viewed the GMRA as 
an attempt by Congress to hurry the relatively slow implementation of the various 
legislative financial reform acts of the previous five years. 40   
C. CONTINUED INITIATIVES 
These actions and improvements provide a start for discussing the work 
that is still to be done to fully implement the financial legislative reforms of the 
1990s.  Continued expansion of financial reforms is further evidence of the value 
of perceived benefits of the legislative reform initiatives of the 1990s. 
1. Accountability of Tax Dollars Act 2002 
The GAO made recommendations based on various reports for inclusion 
of other federal agencies in the CFO Act requirement for audited financial 
statements. 41  One study of CFO and GMRA act agencies showed that most 
have either achieved or expect to achieve significant benefit from financial 
 
37 U.S. Public Law 104-208, 104th Cong. (30 September 1996), Section 802. 
38 Ewer, 26. 
39 Ibid, 27. 
40 Danny L. Athanasaw, “Financial Management Reform – Noble intentions, Audit Challenges,” 
The Armed Forces Comptroller 43 no. 1 (Winter 1998): 18. 
41 U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management: Extending the Financial Statements 
Audit Requirement of the CFO Act to Additional Federal Agencies (Washington, D.C.: 
USGAO, 2002),  9-11. 
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statement audits. 42  These statements are further proof of the perceived benefits 
of ongoing federal financial reform.  It appears that Congress agreed that CFO 
Act requirements would benefit all federal agencies.  In 2002 Congress passed 
the Accountability of Tax Dollars Act, which extended the requirement for audited 
financial statements to all agencies with budget authority in excess of 25 million 
dollars.43  The list of federal agencies covered by this act is exhaustive, with over 
78 federal agencies affected.  Agencies affected include the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the National 
Transportation Safety Board, among others. 
2. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-136 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released OMB Circular A-
136 in 2004 reinforcing its guidelines for submission of agency financial 
statements. 44  OMB A-136 additionally spelled out information regarding the 
preparation and submission of agency Performance and Accountability Reports 
(PAR).  The PAR provides a combined summary of financial and performance 
results information as required by the GPRA and CFO Act.45  These reports are 
an important step in supporting the PMA and in reinforcing support for audited 
financial statements. 
D. FURTHER LITERATURE REVIEW 
Beyond the singular goals of individual legislative initiatives, many views 
have been provided as to the intent and purpose of the collective legislation.  
Brook, from a collection of congressional statements, posits the intent of audited 
financial statements (and, one can argue, the intent of all financial reform 
initiatives) as four-fold: 1) Improvement in financial systems and standards; 2) to 
provide reliable information for agency managerial decisions; 3) to provide 
 
42 U.S. General Accounting Office, Survey Results of Selected Non-CFO Act Agencies View on 
having Audited Financial Statements (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2001), 2-3. 
43 U.S. Public Law 107-289, 107th Cong. (7 November 2002), Section 2. 
44 Office of Management and Budget, Financial Reporting Requirements (Washington D.C.: 
OMB, 2004).  
45 Office of Management and Budget, Financial Reporting Requirements, 1. 
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reliable information for government decision makers in program and resource 
allocation; and 4) stewardship.46  This view on the purposes appears to be a 
comprehensive and mainstream view that many scholars corroborate.  Longo 
and Steinberg47 also make the case for stewardship and, by implication of 
incorporation of private sector financial practices, the improvement of financial 
systems and controls.  Similar purposes are reiterated in works by Boerum48 and 
the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office (GAO).49
One of the goals of the legislative reforms was the improvement of 
financial systems.  West and Clarke50 discuss early problems with federal 
agencies and the lack of integrated financial systems.  In 1995, West and Clarke 
point to information that only 29% of systems were part of a single integrated 
system.51  By 2003 we see that 20 of the 24 CFO and GMRA agencies (or 83%) 
have an integrated financial system.52  While it is clear there is still work to be 
done, the literature supports a positive trend in accomplishing the goal of 
improved financial management systems in federal agencies. 
Reliable information for both internal and external agency decision makers 
is a function of the accuracy and conformity of financial data available.  Steinberg 
is one proponent and agrees that as more agencies prepare audited financial 
 
46 Douglas Brook, Audited Financial Statements: Getting and Sustaining Clean Opinions 
(Arlington VA: The PricewaterhouseCoopers Endowment for the Business of Government, 
July 2001), 9. 
47 Ronald Longo and Harold Steinberg, "The Federal Governments First Audited Government-
wide Financial Statements," The Government Accountants Journal 47, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 
18. 
48 Ken Boerum, “Why are We Doing This New Accounting?” The Armed Forces Comptroller 49 
no. 2 (Spring 2004): 23. 
49 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Fiscal Year 2004 US Government Financial 
Statements:  Sustained Improvement in Federal Financial Management Is Crucial to 
Addressing our Nation’s Future Fiscal Challenges (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2004), 2. 
50 Andrew West and David Clarke, “Government as Business,” The Government Accountants 
Journal 45, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 23. 
51 Ibid, 23. 
52 U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Management Systems: Core Financial Systems at 
the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2003), 2. 
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statements, the value to decision makers will grow.53 If an unqualified audit 
opinion signals accurate financial information we can see that the goal is close, 
but not fully successful.  Of the 24 federal agencies, 18 have achieved and 
sustained an unqualified opinion for at least two years.54  Further evidence of 
informational value to decision makers is discussed in Section IIIA. 
 
 
53 Harold Steinberg, "The CFO Act: A Look at Federal Accountability,” Journal of Accountancy 
181, no. 3 (March 1996): 56. 
54 Reference Table 1 
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III. FINANCIAL MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 
Various financial measurement systems exist for the federal government.  
The analysis in this paper focuses on three measurement systems – audited 
financial statements, the PMA Scorecard, and GAO High Risk Series.  A brief 
overview of the objectives, content, and accomplishments of each system is 
provided.  This background is important to understand the basic aspects of the 
systems and in analyzing their relationships to each other. 
A. FEDERAL AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
1. Objectives and Purpose 
Financial statements are standardized formats used to report financial 
information to external decision makers.55  The statements are designed to 
provide the decision maker information on whether the organization is “using 
their resources effectively and efficiently.”56  For-profit companies prepare 
balance sheets, income statements, and cash flow statements to meet generally 
accepted accounting principles.  While these formats don’t directly apply to 
government agencies, the theories behind them do.  Specific formats are 
discussed in Section III.A.2, below. 
Financial statement audits are performed to provide assurance that 
financial statement assertions adhere to generally accepted accounting 
principles.57  These assertions are done for a variety of reasons.  Most believe 
the beneficiaries of financial statement audits are solely creditors and potential 
investors.  In fact, independent audits may be performed for additional reasons 
as well.  Taylor and Glezen propose two other reasons for financial statement 
 
55 Robert Ingram and Thomas Albright and Bruce Baldwin, Financial Accounting: A Bridge to 
Decision Making, 5th ed. (Ohio: Thomson South-Western, 2004), F129. 
56 Ibid, F143. 
57 Donald Taylor and William Glezen, Auditing: An Assertions Approach, 7th ed. (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 4. 
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audits:  stewardship and motivation.58  Summarized, audited financial statements 
provide stewardship through support to the belief that managers, as agents for a 
company’s owners, are acting in accordance with their interests.  Additionally, 
audited financial statements motivate managers to truthfully and diligently 
prepare statements as they know they will be audited.59
Government financial statement audits serve a similar purpose.  The 
combined GAO and President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) 
Financial Audit Manual state the “overall purposes of performing financial 
statement audits of federal entities include providing decision makers (financial 
statement users) with assurance as to whether the financial statements are 
reliable, internal control is effective, and laws and regulations are complied 
with.”60  This is done through enforcing Federal Accounting Standards Advisory 
Board (FASAB) developed generally accepted accounting principles on financial 
statements.  The mission of the FASAB is to “promulgate federal accounting 
standards after considering the financial and budgetary information needs of 
citizens, congressional oversight groups, executive agencies, and the needs of 
other users of federal financial information.”61  As the standard-setting body for 
federal government accounting principles, agency financial statements must 
conform to their guidance. 
It is easy to see that the objectives of federal financial statement audits as 
described by the GAO meet some of the same needs as for-profit organizations.  
It meets stewardship needs of the public and Congress and provides valuable 
motivation to improve and sustain financial accountability.  Creditor and investor 
needs aren’t apparent in the strictest interpretation of audited financial statement 
goals.   However, tax-paying citizens and businesses can be seen as analogous 
 
58 Taylor and Glezen, 9-10. 
59 Ibid, 10. 
60 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Financial Audit Manual Vol 1, (Washington, D.C.: 
USGAO, 2004), 100-1 
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entities for creditors and investors of the federal government.  While statements 
differ in content from for-profit companies, they serve the same purpose. 
2. Content 
Financial statements prepared by federal government agency contain 
standard statements.  The main statements are the balance sheet, statement of 
net cost, and changes in net position.  These three statements, for the most part, 
perform the function of reporting the U.S. Government financial position and 
operations.  
The balance sheet serves a similar purpose as in for-profit accounting.  It 
describes the summation of agency assets and liabilities.  The consolidated 
statements of net cost summarize the departments operating costs.  It is 
intended to provide, in one report, the cost of all operations of the federal agency.  
The statement of changes in net position and net cost might be seen as a proxy 
for the standard income statement.  As the federal government is not in the 
business of making money, revenues in a traditional sense are replaced by taxes 
and other federal duties.  It also presents the outflow of expenses that each 
agency generates in the fulfillment of its services and mission.   These 
statements, along with the systems and methods used to prepare the 
statements, are the subject of audits. 
The overall objective of the audit report is to present an opinion on 
financial statement presentation in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles.  There are four types of opinions that may be issued: 
unqualified, qualified, disclaimer, or adverse.  Each opinion represents a differing 
degree of conformity to generally accepted accounting principles and are 
summarized below from Taylor and Glezen. 62
 
61 Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board [web page], Available at: http://www.fasab.gov/.  
Accessed 18 November 2005. 
62 Taylor and Glezen, 34-35. 
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• Unqualified – statements are presented fairly in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
• Qualified – except for matters pertaining to the qualification, 
statements are presented fairly in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. 
• Disclaimer – auditor cannot express an opinion.  Typically due to 
the auditor not being able to obtain necessary information to make 
an opinion. 
• Adverse – financial statements represent a severe departure from 
generally accepted accounting principles. 
The information used and analyzed for comparisons in this study will be at 
the audit opinion level.  The opinion conveys the reliability and integrity of 
financial statements, but makes no performance judgment.   It may be thought of 
as representing the accountability of all funds entrusted to and spent by each 
agency.   A summary of opinions for analyzed agencies is presented in Table 1.
 Agency 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
DOC D D D U U U U U U
DOD D D D D D D D D D
DOE U U Q U U U U U U
DOI Q U U U U U U U U
DOJ D D D Q Q U U U D
DOL Q U U U U U U U U
DOT D D D U Q U U U U
EDUCATION D U D Q Q Q U U U
EPA Q U U Q U U U U U
GSA U U U U U U U U U
HHS D Q Q U U U U U U
HUD Q Q U D U U U U D
NASA U U U U U D U D D
NRC U U U U U U U U U
NSF Q Q U U U U U U U
OPM D D D D U U U U U
SBA U U U U U U D D Q
SSA U U U U U U U U U
STATE Q U U U U U U U U
TREASURY D Q Q Q U U U U U
USAID D D D D D D Q U U
USDA D D D D D D U U U




D = Disclaimer  
Table 1.   Audited Financial Statement Results63 
Source:  Author created from 1999 – 2004 Financial Reports of the U.S. 




Most federal agencies have had 15 years to implement the requirements 
of the CFO Act and almost 10 years for other legislative financial reforms.  The 
impact of these reforms on how government does business is immense.  The 
effort entailed in getting an unqualified audit opinion on statements has been a 
major part of that undertaking.  In 1990, only three agencies were audited and 
none received an unqualified opinion.64  Gross reports that in 1996, six years 
                                                 
63 While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) have had or are required to have financial statements, they have been 
removed for purposes of comparison due to their consolidation. 
64 Daniel Gross, “Baby Steps,” CFO 12 no. 7 (July 1996): 28. 
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after the CFO Act and two years after the GMRA extended the requirement to 24 
federal agencies, only 7 agencies received a clean opinion. 65  Longo provides a 
comparison to the 2004 audit results which show that 17 agencies received an 
unqualified opinion. 66  These accomplishments show a good trend toward 
financial accountability (timely, reliable information) in federal agencies that was 
lacking prior to 1990. 
Equally important to receiving an unqualified opinion is the effect it has on 
financial systems.  While many agree on the purposes and goals of financial 
statement audits, they are important only if they actually provide value to the 
government.  A GAO survey of Non-CFO Act agencies showed that all agencies 
that did complete an audit received a “significant” benefit from the audit.  The 
reported benefits met were those described by the general goals of financial 
reform legislation. 67  West and Clarke cite a Coopers and Lybrand LLP survey to 
government financial managers in which most agree that there is great value in 
completing financial reforms and accomplishing financial statements. 68  Their 
survey further states that “the primary value of financial statements… has not so 
much been the documents themselves, but instead the process of developing 
them.”69  There are great benefits to creating standardized financial statements 
than just having the validated information itself.  Longo and Steinberg discuss 
this key element further by describing a benefit of the financial audit process as 
an understanding of the systems, controls, and tasks in the process. 70
 
65 Ibid, 27. 
66 Ronald Longo, “Accelerated Financial Reporting in the Federal Government – How Did It Go?” 
The Journal of Government Financial Management 54 no. 1 (Spring 2005): 33. 
67 U.S. GAO, Financial Management: Extending the Financial Statements Audit Requirement, 5-
6. 
68 Andrew West and David Clarke, “Government as Business,” The Government Accountants 
Journal 45, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 2. 
69 Ibid, 2. 
70 Ronald Longo and Harold Steinberg, "The Federal Governments First Audited 
Governmentwide Financial Statements," The Government Accountants Journal 47, no. 2 
(Summer 1998): 24. 
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In addition to providing a good history on the implementation of the major 
financial reform acts of the 1990s, Ewer discusses the value of standard 
government financial statements by providing an illustrative reference to private 
sector companies.71  Similar references to the value of government/private sector 
financial statements are provided by Chapin.72  These benefits include standard 
private sector accounting benefits such as revenue, liability, and asset 
recognition and accountability. One could almost assume that the value of 
standardized reports and statements would be an intuitive benefit for the 
government. However, it took 200 years before the U.S. government took steps 
to implement such ideas, so their value in this discussion shouldn’t be 
discounted. 
Moving beyond value in a theoretical or general sense, examples can be 
identified of dollars saved due to the financial reforms resulting from audited 
financial statements.  Due to the development of audited financial statements, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development has been able to pinpoint 
violations and has recouped $75M in costs.73  West and Clarke provide further 
information showing monetary savings due to audits on federal financial 
statements.74  Tabulating realized savings in comparison to implementation costs 
would be an interesting further study. 
 
71 Sid Ewer, “Federal Government Accountability,” The CPA Journal 67 no. 3 (March 1997): 22. 
72 Donald Chapin. “U.S. General Accounting Office Perspective on Future Audit Issues,” The 
CPA Journal 65 no. 1 (January 1995): 32-33. 
73 Katherine Peters, “Dollars & Sense,” Government Executive 30 no. 6 (June 1998): 43. 
74 West and Clarke, 25-26. 
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B. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE HIGH RISK SERIES 
1. Objectives and Purpose 
Begun in 1990, the High Risk Series focuses the GAO audit and 
evaluation expertise to “identify federal programs and operations that are high 
risk, in some cases, due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, 
and mismanagement.”75  Since 1993, the GAO has updated the list every 2 
years to coincide with new congressional sessions.   The reports have a much 
broader focus than strictly financial management.  Many of the risks evaluated by 
the GAO include efforts in agency contracting, transformation, taxes, and 
modernization initiatives, to name a few. 
While the High Risk Series covers many areas, the specific focus on this 
report is on financial management.  Originally designated as a high risk area for 
agencies in 1990, financial management has continued to be a problem through 
the 15 years of GAO evaluation.  Most federal agencies have struggled to meet 
the mandates of reform legislation over the past 15 years.  GAO does not include 
all of these agencies on its High Risk List, only those that exhibit extreme 
financial management challenges. 
2. Content  
Each report covers two main functions:  an update on the status of 
existing identified risks and adds new issues as needed.  The report summarizes 
the problems associated with each agency that have drawn the attention of GAO 
evaluation.  Organizations that have been audited and added to the high risk list 
have exhibited a much larger degree of failure in obtaining financial statement 
assurance and scorecard success.   
The list of those agencies covered by the GAO High Risk Series for 
financial management is rather short.  Figure 1 summarizes those agencies and 
includes the year they were first added to the GAO list, and the year removed if 
 
75 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, High Risk Series: An Update (Washington, D.C.: 
USGAO, 2003), 3. 
appropriate.  The GAO high risk designation is usually conferred on sub-
agencies of the 24 CFO Act agencies.  In the case where this happens, the 
responsible CFO Act agency has been listed for purposes of comparison 








USDA Forest Service 1999 2005
DOT FAA 1999 2005
Treasury IRS 1990
Treasury Customs Service 1991 1999  
Figure 1.   GAO High Risk Financial Management Issues76 
Source: Author created from U.S. GAO, High Risk Series 2005 
 
3. Accomplishments 
The GAO has provided audit and evaluation service to federal agencies 
since its inception.  Therefore, it is no surprise that their influence on federal 
agencies included in their high risk list is substantial.  A look at the timeline of 
agency concerns covered by the high risk list proves this point. 
GAO completed its 1990 report by marking 14 agency concerns as high 
risk.  While there has been significant additions over the years (27 have been 
added), there has also been 16 areas removed.77 Given the length of time and 
scope of effort required to fix these significant high risk areas, it represents a 
significant achievement.  The actions generated from these reports make it clear 
that federal agencies have taken the GAO High Risk List seriously. 
C. PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA SCORECARD 
1. Objectives and Purpose 
According the GAO, the PMA brings forward major management 
challenges for federal agencies and sets forth the importance of performance 
                                                 
76 Customs Service was part of the Treasury Department during the period analyzed 
77 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, High Risk Series: An Update (Washington, D.C.: 
USGAO, 2005), 3. 
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results. 78  The President and OMB created the PMA to address perceived 
performance and cost inefficiency problems within the federal government.  
While achieving an unqualified opinion on audited financial statements is 
important, the current administration thinks that it should be a given.79  The PMA 
was created to move beyond that.  Its goal is reform, and a focus on improving 
the performance and management of government.80  The President has initially 
focused on five government-wide areas of reform and various additional agency 
specific challenges.  These government-wide areas were selected as the 
problems were “generally agreed to be serious,” and all reflected the desire of 
the President to achieve near-term, measurable results.81
Of the five government-wide challenge areas, one specifically applies and 
will be used in this systems analysis.  That government-wide focus area is titled 
improving financial performance.  OMB states that the objective of the improved 
financial performance initiative is “for agencies to have accurate and timely 
financial information to manage cost and achieve efficiencies.”82  OMB PMA 
guidance states many reasons for the need to focus on improving financial 
performance and they mirror the impetus behind overall financial reform in many 
respects.  OMB sites erroneous payments, audit opinion difficulties, timely 
reporting, and material weaknesses as a few.83
2. Content 
The PMA Scorecard was designed to measure five distinct areas where 
government improvement was needed.  These areas are the strategic 
 
78 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Management Reform: Assessing the President’s 
Management Reform Agenda (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2005), 2. 
79 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Federal Financial 
Management Report 2004 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004): 1. 
80 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President’s 
Management Agenda (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001): 1. 
81 Executive Office of the President, The President’s Management Agenda, 4. 
82 Office of Management and Budget, Achieving Green in Financial Performance (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005): 1. 
83 Executive Office of the President, The President’s Management Agenda, 19-20. 
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management of human capital, budget and performance integration, competitive 
sourcing, expanded electronic government, and improved financial performance.  
For purposes of analysis and system comparison, the focus is on improved 
financial performance. 
The scorecard is presented in a stoplight format.  For the overall financial 
performance results, the ratings are based on the demonstrated ability of the 
agency to meet the measures of success as defined in Figure 2 and above.  A 
rating of green means the agency is fully successful in meeting all desired 
performance standards.  A rating of yellow reflects that the organization is 
somewhat successful and meets performance standards listed under the yellow 
column in Figure 2.  An organization is unsatisfactory if the rating is red.  This 
means that the agency has been unsuccessful in meeting financial performance 
standards.  Yearly scorecard ratings for each since the programs inception are 
provided in Table 2. 
The government wide focus on improved system performance revolves 
around meeting the standards for audit opinions, financial statements, internal 
controls, and material weaknesses.  OMB defines those standards required to 
achieve a yellow as ‘compliance’ standards – meaning that they are required to 
comply with legislation relating to accurate, timely, and reliable financial 
reports.84  Achieving a scorecard rating of green means that the agency has met 
‘results’ standards – defined by OMB Standards to mean the information is being 
used by managers to improve agency operations.85 A list of standards required 
for each scorecard rating is summarized in Figure 2. 
 
84 OMB, Achieving Green, 1. 
85 Ibid. 
 
Figure 2.   PMA Financial Performance Standards 
Source:  The Presidents Management Agenda: the Scorecard [web page] 
 
A rating of yellow or red does not necessarily mean that agency success 
is completely out of reach.  OMB also provides a measure of agency progress 
toward achieving the standards as outlined.  The President’s Management 
Agenda website defines the progress measures thusly: 
• Green: Implementation is proceeding according to plans agreed 
upon with the agencies;  
• Yellow: Some slippage or other issues requiring adjustment by the 
agency in order to achieve the initiative objectives on a timely 
basis; and  
• Red: Initiative in serious jeopardy. Unlikely to realize objectives 
absent significant management intervention.86 
It is important to note that while the agency success is graded based on 
prescribed criteria, the progress scorecard is more of a subjective assessment by 
OMB based on predefined objectives.   A yearly summary of agency scorecard 
progress is shown in Table 3. 
                                                 
86 The President’s Management Agenda:  The Scorecard [web page].  Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/results/agenda/scorecard.html  Accessed 14 November 2005. 
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Agency 2002 2003 2004 2005
DOC R R R G
DOD R R R R
DOE R Y G G
DOI R R R R
DOJ R R R R
DOL Y Y Y G
DOT R R R R
EDUCATION R R G G
EPA R G G G
GSA Y Y R Y
HHS R R R R
HUD R R R R
NASA R R R R
NSF G G G G
OPM R Y Y R
SBA R R R R
SSA Y G G G
STATE R R Y G
TREASURY R R R R
USAID R R R R
USDA R R R R
VA R R R R  
Table 2.   PMA Scorecard Results87 
Source:  Author created from The Presidents Management Agenda:  the 
Scorecard [web page] 
 
                                                 
87 While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) have had or are required to have financial statements, they have been 
removed for purposes of comparison due to their consolidation. 
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 Agency 2002 2003 2004 2005
DOC G G G G
DOD G G Y R
DOE G G G Y
DOI R Y Y Y
DOJ G G G Y
DOL G G G G
DOT G G G G
EDUCATION Y G G G
EPA Y G G G
GSA G G G G
HHS Y G G G
HUD Y G G G
NASA G G Y Y
NSF G G G G
OPM G G G G
SBA G G G G
SSA G G G G
STATE G G G G
TREASURY G Y Y Y
USAID Y G G G
USDA G G G G
VA Y G Y Y  
Table 3.   PMA Scorecard Progress88 
Source:  Author created from The Presidents Management Agenda:  the 
Scorecard [web page] 
 
3. Accomplishments 
In 2005, the GAO called the PMA fundamental to addressing 21st century 
management challenges.89  While it is apparent that any attempt to address 
basic and systemic problems within the federal government would be considered 
important, the high level visibility and support for the PMA is what will make it 
successful.  The 2004 Federal Financial Management Report, issued by the 
Office of Management and Budget, lists many accomplishments that have been 
                                                 
88 While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) have had or are required to have financial statements, they have been 
removed for purposes of comparison due to their consolidation. 
89 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Management Reform: Assessing the President’s 
Management Reform Agenda (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2005), 2. 
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achieved to date as a result of the President’s Management Agenda.  Some of 
the notable achievements include the acceleration of financial reporting and 
agency-provided quarterly reports.90  While understanding that this initiative is 
new, we are likely to see many more achievements in the years to come as 
agencies move beyond minimum requirements to managing for results.  Over 
time, current agency plans for meeting PMA requirements will be effectively 
implemented in organizations.  As a learning curve on PMA requirements is 
realized, these greater agency performance achievements will be met. 
Many scholars believe the scorecard does promote agency improvement.  
Michael sees the scorecard as motivating force for reform in those areas 
tracked.91  A panel of public administration experts backs up this assertion.  Most 
are encouraged by the focus on financial management and believe that the PMA 
provides a disciplined approach for management reform.92  Breul believes that 
the PMA is a valuable tool for the continued reform of federal financial 
management and suggests steps for further action and improvements. 93  David 
also agrees that the PMA shows that the government is serious about addressing 
cost and performance management needs in reform and decision making.94  By 
moving federal agencies toward a scorecard rating of green, much needed 
financial performance goals will be met. 
 
90 Executive Office of the President, Federal Financial Management Report 2004, 6-7. 
91 Sarah Michael, “Agencies Find Greener Pastures,” Federal Computer Week 18 no. 24 (19 July 
2004): 8. 
92 Timothy Clark, ed. “Grades Are In,” Government Executive 36 no. 12 (15 July 2004): 6. 
93 Jonathan Breul, “President’s Management Agenda:  What Comes Next?” The Business of 
Government (Spring 2005): 58-59. 
94 Irwin T. David, “Financial Information for Program, Policy, and Operating Officials,” The Journal 
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IV. FINANCIAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
A. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the financial systems analysis is to compare audited 
financial statement indicators with the PMA Scorecard and GAO High Risk 
Series.  Through a comparison of interrelationships between the systems it will 
identify signal markers for agency success on the PMA Scorecard, the current 
administration’s final measure of financial reform success. 
The analysis begins with a look at audited financial statements and PMA 
Scorecard as independent systems over time.  Two objectives are created in this 
analysis.  The first is to determine if sustained success on audit financial 
statement opinions is attainable, and if so, is it the norm.  The second is to look 
at what impact PMA progress ratings have on the overall scorecard result, if any. 
Relationship analysis of the financial systems will look at the impact of 
audited financial statement opinions on PMA Scorecard success, and the 
influence of the GAO High Risk Series on both systems.  By comparing audit 
opinion success to PMA Scorecard results, we hope to see a relationship 
between the length of sustained unqualified opinions and scorecard success.  
The relationship will also help to identify those agencies who have exhibited the 
greatest success, in hopes of providing a benchmark for other agencies.  The 
GAO comparison is designed to discover if evidence exists to suggest that the 
GAO High Risk Series identification results in improved financial success. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Raw data on three financial systems has been previously summarized.  
For audited financial systems and PMA Scorecard, the data can be viewed as 
ordinal.  In other words, the results are in order – Green is better than yellow 
which is better than red; Unqualified is better than qualified which is better than 
disclaimer.  However, there is no specific, meaningful, or consistent data that 
comes from measuring interval between the data.  Data for the GAO High Risk 
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Series is used strictly as a comparison over time.  Information is provided as to 
the addition and removal of agencies from the list and this is used to compare 
potential relationships with the audited financial statement opinions and PMA 
Scorecard results. 
While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have had, or are required to have, 
PMA Scorecard reports, they have been removed for purposes of comparisons.  
Agency consolidations that took place after 9/11 have removed FEMA from 
scored agencies in place of DHS.  To get a similar look at agencies across time 
and for comparison between PMA Scorecard and audited financial statements, 
they have been removed.  In addition, for comparisons between PMA Scorecard 
and Audited Financial Statements, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has also 
been removed.  They are not a scorecard-graded agency and thus comparisons 
are not possible.  This effectively results in a comparison of 22 federal agencies. 
C. TRENDS WITHIN SYSTEMS 
1. Audited Financial Statement Sustained Success 
All CFO Act agencies, with the exception of the Department of Defense, 
have achieved two or more years of unqualified audit opinions.  However, not all 
agencies have been able to sustain this success in consecutive years.  As a 
basis for system comparison, one would expect sustained audit opinion success 
(a measure of accountability and reliability) would be a significant factor in 
achieving the goals of PMA.  A look at agency sustainment of financial statement 
audit opinions is provided. 
Yearly agency financial statement audit opinions are provided in Table 1.  
As we compare the 21 agencies (DoD is the exception) that have received an 
unqualified opinion, we see that a majority of those agencies have been able to 
sustain the success.  67% of federal agencies, once they have obtained an 
unqualified opinion, have sustained it for the remaining years.  Three agencies, 
the Department of the Interior (DOI), Department of Transportation (DOT), and 
Department of Education received a one year qualified opinion and immediately 
went back up to an unqualified opinion.  If we include these three agencies, 81% 



















































Unqualified 21 14 67%
Sustained With 
One Qualified 21 17 81%  
Table 4.   Audit Opinion Sustainment 
 
Four (five if you include DoD, which has never achieved anything but a 
disclaimer) agencies have all shown problems in sustaining audit success year in 
and year out – Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 
and Small Business Administration (SBA).  Brook’s studies in 2001 compare 
success factors of those organizations that have achieved and sustained 
success.95  It would be interesting to compare these factors with the five 
agencies that are currently failing to sustain opinions.  Some factors affecting 
agency audited financial statement opinion success might be demographic or 
size/complexity issues.  It could provide further insight into the success factors 
presented in the study and provide potential focus points for those agencies in 
sustaining success. 
Sustainment of unqualified audit opinions is an indicator of timely and 
reliable financial statement data.  It is likely that those agencies that have 
garnered an unqualified opinion have stable financial systems and practices.   
                                                 
95 Brook, Refs. Audited Financial Statements: Getting and Sustaining Clean Opinions and 
Douglas A. Brook, “Business-Style Financial Statements Under the CFO Act: An Examination 
of Audit Opinions” (Ph.D. diss, George Mason University, Fairfax, 2001): 32.” 
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Once these systems and practices are in place, it should be easier to sustain 
successful audit results.  The data supports the assertion that once an opinion is 
earned, it is sustained.  These high standards set the basis of using sustained 
audit opinion success as a factor in determining their relationship to results 
success on the PMA Scorecard. 
2. PMA Progress Rating to PMA Results 
Scorecard ratings are the end measure of an agency’s ability to meet the 
financial management standards as outlined in the PMA.  During the 
development of the scorecard, progress ratings were also added to show agency 
progress toward achieving financial standards.  Based on their intended purpose, 
we would expect progress ratings to signal attainment of overall scorecard 
success.  A look at those ratings as provided in Tables 2 and 3.  The data, at this 





























































One 21 8 38%
Two 19 8 42%
Three 17 8 47%
Four 10 5 50%  
Table 5.   Progress Ratings to Scorecard Results 
 
Only five of ten agencies (50%) which have had green progress ratings for 
four continuous years achieved an overall scorecard rating of green.  This 
percent falls slightly to 47% if we expand the analysis to those agencies which 
have had a green progress rating for three or more years.  The data is not 
significant in establishing a relationship between implementation progress and 
scorecard ratings.  This data is reasonable if we assume that each agency has 
differing timelines for reform implementation.  For example, large agencies would 
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take longer to reform than small agencies.  Further research into individual 
agencies is needed to determine if this is the case. 
About the only thing we can conclude from this analysis is that the 
average time horizon for improvement to a green scorecard result is somewhere 
greater than 4 years of successful progress.  The data concludes that while 
progress ratings are an indicator of agency reform implementation with respect to 
the standards, they do not necessarily signal a timeline for success. 
D. INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SYSTEMS 
1. Overall PMA Scorecard to Audited Financial Statements 
To provide an overall starting picture of agency comparisons, a status of 
the current ratings is provided.  Based on Table 4, we see that in all cases and 
for all agencies, a scorecard rating is not given anything above a red unless the 
agency has garnered an unqualified opinion on the financial statements.  This is 
in line with PMA performance standards.  We also see that agency scorecard 
performance is, in fact, made up of more than just an unqualified opinion.  
Numerous agencies have received and held an unqualified opinion for years but 
have not yet obtained a green on the scorecard.  Is there a specific characteristic 
amongst those agencies who have received green on both financial statements 
and scorecard? 
We know from the PMA Scorecard standards that an agency cannot 
receive a green rating until they implement ‘results’ driven activities with their 
financial information.  The next analysis attempts a further look into agency 
characteristics and length of audited statement success to see if they are good 






DOC U G G
DOD D R R
DOE U G Y
DOI U R Y
DOJ D R Y
DOL U G G
DOT U R G
EDUCATION U G G
EPA U G G
GSA U Y G
HHS U R G
HUD D R G
NASA D R Y
NSF U G G
OPM U R G
SBA Q R G
SSA U G G
STATE U G G
TREASURY U R Y
USAID U R G
USDA U R G
VA U R Y  
Table 6.   Current Status of Measures 
Source:  Author created from 2004 Financial Report of the U.S. 
Government and The Presidents Management Agenda:  the Scorecard 
[web page] 
 
2. Time Phased Comparisons of PMA Scorecard to Audited 
Financial Statements 
The first step in this comparison of audited financial statements to the 
PMA Scorecard is look at the results of the first four years of each system.  
Figure 3 presents a graphical representation of results for both systems.  The 
chart is divided up by year groups, with similar years of each system matched 
together.   In Figure 3, Year 1 represents financial statement results of 1996 and 
scorecard results of 2002.  Within each year group, a one represents either a 
scoring of red or a disclaimer of opinion, based on system.  Similarly, a two 
represents either a yellow on the PMA Scorecard or a qualified opinion on 
audited financial statements, and a three represents a green on the PMA 































Figure 3.   Comparison of Results for First Four Years 
 
While both exhibit a general trend of improvement (as measured from a 
one to three), we see that more agencies started out with successful audited 
financial statement results.  There are several possibilities for this result.  The 
most plausible revolves around the pre-measurement starting point for each 
system.  It is well know that while only a few agencies were required to comply 
with the CFO Act requirement for financial statements in 1990, this legislation did 
signal the potential for its expansion to all agencies.  Many agencies had already 
begun leaning toward meeting this objective prior to the requirement.  In fact, 
Gross reports that almost 118 federal entities had begun producing financial 
statements by 199496.  An additional factor for the perceived head-start on 
successful audited financial statement opinions relates to the timing of the 
GMRA.  The GMRA, which expanded the CFO Act requirements to the 24 
federal agencies, was signed into law in the beginning of fiscal year 2005.  
                                                 
96 Gross, 28. 
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However, it did not mandate compliance until fiscal year 2006 statements, 
effectively giving federal agencies one extra year to work out compliance issues.   
We can better normalize our comparison by eliminating the first year of the 
PMA scores, effectively comparing year two of PMA compliance to what amounts 
to year two in preparation of audited financial statements.  This representation is 
presented in Figure 4.  We see that the curves are more similar and exhibit 
similar upward success trends.  This representation, while telling, still has some 
comparison problems.  Most striking is the much larger percent of scorecard 






























Figure 4.   Comparison Normalized for Starting Year 
 
Another way to compare while removing the potential starting bias is to 
look at the percentage of improvement each year.  This removes a look at overall 
agency success totals with a focus on how agencies improved within those 
years.  Table 7 summarizes the percent improvement in successful ratings for 
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the first four years of each system.  The improvement data provides an 
interesting comparison with the overall trends provided above. 
In the above comparisons of agencies in year one, six had achieved 
unqualified opinions while only one agency had received a green on the 
scorecard.  In comparison, by year four, 14 agencies had achieved an 
unqualified opinion while eight organizations had achieved a green on the 
scorecard.  While those statistics would make it appear that agencies showed 
greater audit opinion improvement over time, in fact, the results are much closer.  
After four years both agencies exhibited a similar improvement rate.  This 
improvement rate shows that agency ability to improve over time is about equal 
























Year 1 to Year 2 23% 9%
Year 2 to Year 3 0% 9%
Year 3 to Year 4 14% 14%
Total Improvement, 
Years 1 to 4 36% 32%  
Table 7.   Scorecard and Audited Financial Statement Improvements 
 
 
3. Audited Financial Statement Trends to PMA Scorecard 
Success 
Do agencies with a longer track record of audited financial statement 
success also find PMA Scorecard success easier?    Of those agencies who 
have newly obtained unqualified opinions (those with three or less years of 
unqualified opinions), none has received a green or yellow scorecard rating.  
Conversely, of those agencies with five years or more of continued unqualified 
audit opinions, 54% have achieved a green PMA Scorecard rating.  This is 
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compared to just 11% (only one of nine) of those agencies without a lengthy 
record (five or more years) of financial statement success. 
The numbers are even more striking when we look at sustained success 
in financial statement preparation.   Of those agencies with over seven years of 
unqualified audit opinions, 80% have achieved a PMA Scorecard rating of green.  
This suggests that those agencies with a track record of financial accountability 
are better prepared to meet performance and results goals.  This makes intuitive 
sense.  An agency will only be able to achieve results if it can first be assured of 
solid, dependable financial data.  Reliable and timely information is the 
foundation for which agencies can then manage for results. 
Eight total agencies have achieved a scorecard rating of green.  Four 
agencies with a seven year track record of unqualified opinions have scored a 
green on the scorecard.  Of the other four agencies, three have also experienced 
a long record or unqualified opinions.  Those three have only failed to garner an 
unqualified opinion in one year out of their last eight, and in all cases it was a 
qualified opinion.  This shows that almost all (88%) of agencies with a track 
record of unqualified financial statement opinions are more apt to succeed under 
the PMA Scorecard financial management initiative.  The lone exception to this is 
the Department of Education, which we will discuss in further analysis. 




















































Less than 3 17 8 47%
3 years or more 16 8 50%
5 years or more 13 7 54%
Over 7 5 4 80%
Over 7 and one 
qualified opinion 8 7 88%  
Table 8.   Length of Audited Financial Statement Success to Scorecard 
 
A further comparison of the eight agencies that have achieved a green 
scorecard rating is used to estimate the average amount of years between 
sustained unqualified audit opinions and PMA Scorecard green.  On average, it 
takes 5.25 years of unqualified opinions before an agency achieves a green 
‘results’ rating on the scorecard.  However, with a range of 6 years and a 
standard deviation of 2.12 years, the statistic is hardly telling.  While the average 
number of years provides only an interesting statistic, the bottom line is that 
lengthy, consecutive unqualified opinions are a valuable signaling indicator. 
4. Successful Agencies across Financial Measurement Systems 
So which agencies are the examples that should be looked at for 
success?  Reviewing yearly financial data of all agencies, we are able to 
complete this simplest of comparisons.  We can readily identify those specific 
agencies that exhibit a high degree of financial success within the existing 
financial measurement framework. 
Beginning with yearly results for the PMA Scorecard, we see that three 
agencies have achieved fully successful result of green for three or more years.  
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These agencies are the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the Social Security Administration (SSA).  All 
three of these agencies also demonstrate a long track record of unqualified audit 
opinions.  These agencies could be thought of as benchmarks for financial 
accountability and performance success.  However, the ease of success might 
be precisely what makes another organization a better study case on how to 
achieve financial reform. 
Unlike the three previous agencies, the Department of Education has a 
checkered history of financial success.  The Department of Education’s first six 
years of audited financial statements resulted in two disclaimers, three qualified 
statements, and only one unqualified.  However, with the exception of 1997, they 
showed improvement in opinions in every year until their eventual sustained 
unqualified opinion from 2002 on.  Their scorecard results are similar, with a red 
in the first two years and a green from 2004 on.  This ability to turn around 
financial accountability and performance positions might make for a good case 
study on the steps it takes to correct financial deficiencies in a federal agency, 
potentially helping to identify key financial reforms and lay a roadmap to success. 
5. GAO High Risk List to PMA Scorecard and Audited Financial 
Statements 
A link between the PMA Scorecard and the GAO High Risk List is 
evidenced from the initial development of the PMA.  The initial executive branch 
report on the PMA alludes to the influence of the GAO in its development of the 
scorecard: "The need for reform is urgent. The General Accounting Office (GAO) 
“high-risk” list identifies areas throughout the federal government that are most 
vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Ten years ago, the GAO found eight such 
areas. Today it lists 22.”97   
Among those agencies identified on the high risk list, is there evidence in 
the data to suggest that agencies have improved financial accountability and 
 
97 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, The President’s 
Management Agenda (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001): 2. 
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performance as a result of being identified?  Or at the very least, has the GAO 
recognized gains as shown through the positive scorecard and audited financial 
statements ratings on its evaluation of those agencies with financial management 
risk?  This relationship can be determined by looking individually at those 
agencies which have been (or still are) on the high risk list over time, and 
compared directly to the PMA Scorecard and audited financial statements over 
the same time. 
Agency information is presented in Figure 5.  Audited Financial Statement 
Data is presented as Disclaimer of Opinion (D), Qualified Opinion (Q), and 
Unqualified Opinion (U).  PMA Scorecard Data is shown according to standard 
stoplight criteria: Red (R), Yellow (Y), Green (G).  GAO High Risk Data is 
presented as an arrow which shows the length of time on the High Risk List.  A 
line that stops with a circle represents the date is was removed; an arrow 
represents an agency that is still on the list.   
Upon initial review, there does not appear to be much of a connection 
between GAO recommendations and audited financial statement or scorecard 
results.  Of the five agencies that have been recognized by GAO for having a 
high risk in financial management, only two organizations are still on the list.  The 
Customs Service (then a part of the Department of Treasury) was removed in 
1999 while the Forest Service and Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) were 
removed recently in 2005. 
While there is no quantifiable link between audited financial statements 
and the GAO list, sustained unqualified opinions do appear to be a signaling 
indicator of removal from the high risk list.  GAO reports provide a summary of 
the reasons that an agency was removed from the list.  The Customs Service 
was removed in 1999 after it received two years of clean audit opinions and 
showed improvement in other areas.98  The Forest Service and FAA were 
removed for similar reasons including success in meeting clean financial 
 
98 Stephen Barr, “Tasks Sliced Many Ways,” Washington Post 26 January 1999. 
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statements and continued improvements in other financial management areas.99  
This would, at first, lend one to believe there is a close tie between audited 
financial statements and the high risk list.  It is important to note though, that in 
all cases GAO did not remove the agency from the high risk list until it 
demonstrated sustained improvement.  In this case, an unqualified opinion on 
audited financial statements would be a leading indicator of removal from the 
GAO High Risk Series. 
While the data may be inconclusive at this point, this does not say that 
agency identification on the list has no value.  The value is inherently shown; of 
the five agencies that have been identified, three have been removed from the 
list.  Apparently, the increased notoriety and advice supplied in the GAO report 
provides valuable motivation for an agency to reform its financial management 
systems. 
Other than concluding that GAO can pick agencies with a poor record of 
financial management performance, there appears to be no relationship between 
the GAO High Risk List and the PMA Scorecard.  It may be too early to say for 
sure though.  All agencies listed on the GAO High Risk Series have yet to obtain 
a yellow or green rating scorecard rating.  However, two agencies have been 
recently removed from the GAO list.  It would be valuable to check within a year 
or two to see if there is any correlation between removal of these two agencies 
and scorecard success. 
 
99 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, High Risk Series: An Update (Washington, D.C.: 
USGAO, 2005), 11,13. 
Department of Defense 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Audited Financial Statements D D D D D D D D D
PMA Scorecard Results R R R R
PMA Scorecard Progress G G Y R
GAO High Risk
US Department of Agriculture 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Audited Financial Statements D D D D D D U U U
PMA Scorecard Results R R R R
PMA Scorecard Progress G G G G
GAO High Risk
Department of Transportation 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Audited Financial Statements D D D U Q U U U U
PMA Scorecard Results R R R R
PMA Scorecard Progress G G G G
GAO High Risk
Department of Treasury 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Audited Financial Statements D Q Q Q U U U U U
PMA Scorecard Results R R R R
PMA Scorecard Progress G Y Y Y
GAO High Risk  
Figure 5.   GAO Comparison 
Source:  Author created from 2004 Financial Report of the U.S. 
Government, and The Presidents Management Agenda:  the Scorecard 
[web page], and U.S. GAO, High Risk Series 
 
E. SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIPS 
The analysis of the individual systems reveals a few conclusions.  The first 
notable conclusions deal with the analysis of financial systems.  Sustainment of 
results, whether it is in sports, business, or any other activity, is a mark of 
achievement.  As such, in reviewing audited financial statement unqualified 
opinions, it has become evident that in most cases, an agency that first attains an 
unqualified opinion will most likely keep that opinion in the future.  This is a 
testament to the development of systems and procedures that have been 
modified to achieve such results.  It is prime support for the worth of legislative 
and executive financial reforms of over the past 15 years. 
Sustainable financial statement achievement is a starting point for 
comparison between audited financial statements and PMA Scorecard.  Based 
on an analysis between audited financial statements and the scorecard, it is 
apparent that continuous unqualified audit opinions signal scorecard rating 
success.  This is attributed to a number of factors, included standardized 
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financial systems, reliable and accurate financial data, and an understanding of 
agency operations that come with years of financial improvement. 
Another interesting relationship is how agencies appear to improve within 
a system at similar rates.  Within the four years, agency improvement was 
measured at almost the same rate within both systems.  Only time will tell if this 
relationship holds up over the next few years with the scorecard results, but it is 
quite plausible.  As agencies are required to meet certain objectives or 
standards, they are likely to conform to these standards over time.  
One of the more important results that the analysis points to is the 
existence of benchmark agencies for achieving success under the current 
systems.  The EPA, NSF, and SSA have exhibited a strong track record of 
success within these measures.  The Department of Education is notable in that, 
in both audit opinions and scorecard ratings, they fought through poor scores to 
excellent results by making the necessary changes within its organization. 
The GAO High Risk List, while a vital part of government auditing and 
evaluation function, likely has little direct relationship on financial statements or 
scorecard success.  While the report and list provide valuable insight and support 
challenged agencies, there is no discernable link between the GAO reports and 
rankings on either audited financial statements or the PMA Scorecard. 
Unfortunately, while there is no direct correlation between the GAO High Risk 
Series and the scorecard, again, this should not understate its importance in 














• Audited financial statement success, once obtained, is sustained
– 81 % of agencies have sustained success
• Agencies exhibit standard rates of improvement within systems over time
– Over first three years, systems averaged 34% improvement
• Length of audited financial statement success signals PMA Scorecard 
rating success
– 88% of agencies with over seven years of audited statement success have 
scored green on scorecard
• Four agencies: EPA, NSF, SSA, and Dept of Education provide best
benchmark organizations for success
• Impact of PMA progress ratings on scorecard results is inconclusive
• GAO High Risk List has little direct correlation to financial statement or 
scorecard success. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR FURTHER STUDY 
A. SUMMARY 
Existing literature and research on federal financial reform emphasizes a 
government in the midst of great change.  Financial reform was begun in earnest 
in the early 1990s and continues today.  As the guiding legislation of reform, the 
CFO Act established the need for reliable and accurate financial data across 
federal agencies.  It defined CFO responsibilities within agencies and promoted 
the value and importance of improved government financial management.  
Reform was continued with the GPRA and requirement for performance of 
results based financial management.  Agencies continue to face great challenges 
in reforming antiquated financial systems and practices, but for the most part, 
agencies have embraced the change and exhibit proficiency in financial 
management accountability and performance. 
The three systems analyzed – GAO High Risk List, Audited Financial 
Statements, and the President’s Management Agenda Scorecard – demonstrate 
that these reforms have not just been glossed over, but are give much needed 
attention.  Each management system has provided great improvements to the 
financial health of the federal government.  Improvement of financial 
management systems and information support to decision makers has vastly 
improved with reforms over the past 15 years.  The systems demonstrate that the 
executive branch and federal agencies have a renewed focus on the betterment 
of financial management and as stewards of public funds. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
While the three systems are all designed with the idea of reforming 
financial management, they have come about it in distinctly different ways.  
Common financial statements, certified by audit, are intended to convey timely, 
reliable, and accurate financial information to whomever needs it.  The GAO High 
Risk Series provides audit and evaluation services with a focus not only on the 
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problem, but the solution.  While not a comprehensive financial measurement 
system in the same vein as the other two, its individual focus on serious agency 
problems provides valuable results in financial management improvement.  The 
President’s Management Agenda Scorecard is the latest motivator toward sound 
financial management.  Its standards encompass important aspects of 
management and focus on the results-based performance goals that were the 
force behind the CFO Act, GPRA and other legislation.   
Through the analysis, four agencies have been identified as benchmarks 
for financial achievement.  Further studies of these four agencies could provide a 
valuable roadmap toward financial success for other agencies.  The analysis 
should be undertaken with resolve to determine those financial practices and 
automated information systems that support the attainment of unqualified 
opinions and scorecard success. 
Evidence of system overlap is readily apparent between the three 
systems.  While the GAO High Risk Series seems to be based on a “by-
exception” format, its arguments are apparent in the design of the PMA 
Scorecard.  Audited financial statements are a crucial building block in obtaining 
minimum sufficient or ‘compliance’ standards in the PMA Scorecard. The 
scorecard can be seen as the ultimate attainment of financial success, at least 
according to the current administration.  Despite this, all three measures assume 
a crucial role in the evolution of federal agency financial reform. 
Toward this end, we have identified trends with which audited financial 
statements signal scorecard success.  As the length of sustained financial 
statement accountability increases (as measured by unqualified audit opinions), 
the probability of obtaining fully successful performance standards, as measured 
by scorecard green, increases dramatically.  Additionally, there is evidence to 
expect scorecard improvement at a rate similar to audited financial statements.   
Extrapolating from audit financial statement improvement rates, we can 
predict agency success on the PMA Scorecard.  Based on this analysis, we 
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should expect to see a 13% improvement or 3 more agencies obtaining a green 
financial scorecard rating over the next year.  Projecting further forward, we 
should see 82% of the agencies obtaining results-based financial management 
by 2008.  Whether these improvements hold true to form or not is to be seen.  
What is for sure is that any increase in the use of performance-based financial 
management in the federal government is valuable. 
It becomes apparent in the analysis that a strong record of accountability 
and control is a necessity for financial performance.  It is clear from legislative 
mandates in the CFO Act and GPRA along with current executive branch 
directives that results-based financial performance is a focus of federal agency 
management.  Findings show that the length of unqualified audit opinion is a 
factor in PMA Scorecard and results-based financial success.  Financial 
statement accountability, by definition is not the same as performance, but it is a 
required foundation for the results-based financial goals agency and 
congressional leaders strive for.   
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The Department of Defense exhibits perhaps the worst record of agency 
performance in all three financial measurement systems.  Since the early reform 
requirements, DoD has struggled to transform its cumbersome and diverse 
management systems to an integrated and auditable program.  Findings from 
this report show that an agency must first exhibit a history of successful financial 
statement audit success before results-based goals can be achieved.  DoD has 
consistently failed to meet their objectives on obtaining a clean audit opinion as 
evidenced by the past 10 years of disclaimer opinions, the only federal agency 
with this distinction. 
Based on data in this report, if we recognize the need for audit financial 
statement success first, positive improvement on either GAO High Risk Series or 
the PMA Scorecard is much further away.  Unfortunately for the Department of 
Defense, improvement to audit opinion ratings is not expected to happen in the 
next couple of years.  As recently as 2004, the GAO proffered that DoD would 
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not meet its most recent goal of auditable financial statements in 2007.100  The 
study points to flawed management systems and a lack of effective oversight, 
accountability, and monitoring mechanisms, among other findings.101  It is clear 
from findings that sustained audit results must first be obtained before the DoD 
can expect other financial performance-based improvements. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
One of the major tenets of financial reform has been to provide reliable 
information for resource allocation and decision making.  While this paper draws 
conclusions about the trends in financial management reform and the betterment 
of agencies in the defined systems, it does not show or support references to 
decisions based on this improved knowledge.  One would hope to see a shift of 
resources or form of preferential treatment to those organizations with 
demonstrated fiscal and management controls.  However, it appears on the 
surface at least, that political winds or world events continue to be the drivers of 
resource allocation.  This is evidenced by the fact that despite possibly the worst 
record or financial management accountability and performance, the Department 
of Defense budget continues to grow.  A recommendation along these lines 
would be to check for established links between those agencies that have ranked 
well in financial resource management and any government allocation decisions 
that may have resulted from this action.  Additionally, as the FFMIA requires 
reporting on those agency officials who oversee failing systems, are those same 
officials actually punished or rewarded for their role in financial reform? 
Financial reform is costly.  While it is evident from past resource allocation 
mistakes that some form of agency reform was necessary, is the benefit of 
developing and annually preparing financial statements worth the cost?  Millions 
of dollars have been spent and thousands of man-hours are exhausted every 
 
100 U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, Financial Management: Further Actions Are 
Needed to Establish Framework to Guide Audit Opinion and Business Management 
Improvement Efforts at DOD (Washington, D.C.: USGAO, 2004), 3. 
101 Ibid, 1,4. 
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year in the creation of audited financial statements.  In relating back to the 
previous question about statement value to decision makers, are audited 
financial statements and scorecard tracking the most cost beneficial method of 
attaining financial reform results?  Or are other methods more practical?  
Brook prepared extensive studies analyzing demographic and other 
information that are key success factors in unqualified audit opinion 
statements.102  A valuable extension of this study would be to update while 
considering PMA Scorecard ratings and agencies.  Do agency demographic 
factors play a role in scorecard performance ratings?  Are agency success 
factors of audited financial statements the same as those in PMA Scorecard 
ratings?  The determination that these success factors exist across agencies 
meeting multiple financial system objectives would support their value. 
Case study work on those identified benchmark agencies would provide 
great value in developing an approach for successful scorecard rating 
attainment.  There are many different avenues of research to be conducted in 
this area.  The first would be to identify what results-based systems or practices 
agencies followed to obtain a green rating.  Could these practices be transported 
from agency to agency as a model of success?  If so, a framework for financial 
success could be developed and adopted by failing agencies to help lead them to 
financial reform achievement.  Secondly, were these practices in place before 
development of the scorecard standards or have they been developed for the 
sole purpose of achieving that objective?  On would hope that financial reform 
initiatives are undertaken with the sole objective of improved financial data 
quality and usefulness to decision makers.  History tells us this is not always the 
case.  At the very least, we would hope that agency reforms aligned with 
scorecard standards are oriented toward the most beneficial financial information 
and systems possible. 
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